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OVERVIEW
When the Trade Marks Directive (“TMD”)1 was born in 1989,
its European parents could hardly have foreseen the environment
that it would grow up in. Transposed into domestic laws in the
early 1990s, it entered a world that was on the cusp of fundamental
change. The Berlin Wall had just come down, consumers were
starting to own home computers and Netscape was soon to
introduce its internet browser. The world wide web and the
1

First Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC), repealed by Council
Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 32 (EU) [herinafter TMD].
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European Union (“EU”) were opening for business. Yahoo! and
Google were dots on the horizon, with eBay and Facebook not far
behind.
Meanwhile, advances in computing and printing
technology meant illicit traders were able to make counterfeits
faster and more cheaply than ever before. A few years later,
Thomas Friedman declared, much to Aristotle’s surprise, that the
world had become flat.2
Set against this avalanche of innovation and globalization, EU
trademark law has coped remarkably well. Nevertheless, some
aspects of EU trademark law are due for reconsideration.
Acknowledging this, the European Commission (the
“Commission”) sponsored a report into the functioning of the
European trademark system at the EU and national level, which
was presented by the Max Planck Institute in early 2011 (the “Max
Planck Study”).3 The Max Planck Study proposed procedural and
substantive reform, although some controversial issues have been
put to one side.4 At the time of writing, the Commission has not
formally responded to the Max Planck Study, but it is understood
that the Commission was consulted during its preparation and that
many of the Max Planck Study’s recommendations are likely to be
followed.5 Now—as the Commission reviews its options—is a
good time to take stock of how far we have come along the road to
harmonization, and to look at what the future could hold.
We seek to do this by considering three mainstays of trademark
law and practice. First, we examine the extent to which the EU has
successfully harmonized the substantive principles of trademark
2
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2006).
3
Philipp Venohr and Roland Knaak, Study on the Overall Functioning of the
European Trade Mark System, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND COMPETITION LAW (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/
20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf [hereinafter Max Planck Study].
4
See generally id. “Although the lengthy study covers a large number of points, we
have an informal understanding that any issue which proved controversial was left out of
the Study.” JAMES MELLOR QC, ET AL., KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE
NAMES, para. 1-005 n. 11 (15th ed. 2011).
5
Alexander von Mülendahl, The Max-Planck-Study “Study on the Overall
Functioning of the European Trade Mark System”: Background, Findings, Proposals,
EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
TRADE
MARK
ASSOCIATION
(Nov.
2011),
http://www.ecta.org/IMG/pdf/519b-_von_muhlendal_2_.pdf.
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law. We argue that the TMD, the Community Trade Mark
Regulation (“CTMR”),6 and judgments under them, have together
made significant harmonizing steps, but that recent ‘new media’
decisions have begun to muddy the waters. Secondly, we consider
the rather lackluster attempts to harmonize certain EU trademark
evidence and enforcement rules. In particular, these attempts make
it unclear whether the Community Trade Mark (“CTM”) will ever
meet its stated goal of being a unitary right across the whole EU.
Thirdly, we assess the caseload of the EU’s trademark institutions,
and consider how those institutions may need to adapt over the
next twenty years, particularly if the current appetite for European
judicial guidance continues. We conclude by reflecting on how
EU trademark law might mature in the context of international and
foreign norms.
I. SUBSTANTIVE EU TRADEMARK LAW: HARMONIZATION
SUCCESSES AND RECENT DIVERSIONS
Harmonizing substantive trademark law was a core aim of the
TMD and the CTMR.7 We consider below whether this target has
been met by examining two hotly disputed areas of trademark law:
exhaustion and the trademark infringement tests. In particular, we
consider how these issues have been influenced by modern judicial
views on trademark functions, which seem to have taken on a life
of their own. We also investigate how EU trademark infringement
has contorted to address new technologies, and whether the Court
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has—openly as well as
by stealth—broadened the scope of registered trademark
protection, even in the face of objection from Member States.
A. Exhaustion: Free Markets within “Fortress Europe”
A trademark proprietor’s rights are—subject to certain
exceptions—exhausted in respect of goods that are put on the

6

Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) (EC), repealed by Council Regulation
207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 38 (EC) [herinafter CTMR].
7
See TMD, supra note 1, recital 1; CTMR, supra note 6, at recital 1.
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relevant market, under the trademark, by him or with his consent.8
For more than twenty years, the scope of EU trademark exhaustion
has been hard fought, typically between parallel traders, who seek
to profit from price differences across markets, and the trademark
owners, who wish to retain control of their branded goods. This
tension is evident in the case law, but the EU has at least succeeded
in harmonizing the fundamental principles of trademark
exhaustion.
1. Geographical Scope
The harmonization of EU exhaustion began with an important
trade policy choice about geographical scope. European Economic
Area-wide (“EEA”)9 exhaustion enhances free movement of goods
within the EEA but arguably creates an artificial trade barrier
around the EEA. International exhaustion, on the other hand,
could result in European markets being flooded with grey goods
from elsewhere.
The scope of trademark exhaustion also has implications for
trademark functions, in particular whether EU trademark law
should do more than protect a trademark’s ability to guarantee
origin.10 In a typical exhaustion case, a genuine product destined
for a non-EEA market is imported into the EEA, where the
trademark owner’s identical or similar products are already
available. If EU exhaustion laws allow a trademark owner to
prohibit that importation, the prohibition is unlikely to just be
about guaranteeing the origin of goods for consumers, as both the
EEA and foreign goods came from the same company group. The
prohibition might instead be rationalized as a decision to protect
other trademark functions, or explained as trade policy trumping
trademark norms.
Attempting to harmonize the geographical scope of trademark
exhaustion, the TMD and CTMR codified the long-established
principle that free movement of goods within the EEA requires
8

See TMD, supra note 1, art. 7(1); CTMR supra note 6, art. 13(1).
European Economic Area Agreement, EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION,
http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
10
Tuomas Mylly, A Silhouette of Fortress Europe? International Exhaustion of Trade
Mark Rights in the EU, 7 M.J. 1, 17 (2000).
9
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trademark exhaustion on an EEA-wide basis.11 However, for
many years it was unclear whether Member States could allow
exhaustion on a wider—even international—basis. The CJEU, in
Silhouette v. Hartlauer, ruled that they could not.12 This decision
was probably inevitable in the sense that free movement of goods
requires each Member State to abide by the same rules. Allowing
mixed international and EEA exhaustion within Europe would, in
practice, result in significant uncertainty regarding the ability to
import and on-sell grey goods.
Nevertheless, the decision was politically controversial: critics
of “fortress Europe” argued that EEA-only exhaustion would
unnecessarily restrict price competition and consumer freedom.13
In addition, only four Member States openly supported EEA-only
exhaustion at the time.14 The European Commission subsequently
investigated the merits of all Member States adopting international
exhaustion,15 but ultimately proposed that no changes be made.

11

The present wording of the TMD and the CTMR only relates to the EU market.
However, the Agreement on the EEA provides that exhaustion also occurs under the
TMD if the goods are released in any EEA Member State. European Economic Area
Agreement Protocol 1 on Horizontal Adaptations, at No. 8 (July 14, 2012),
http://www.efta.int/~/media/Documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eeaagreement/Protocols%20to%20the%20Agreement/protocol1.pdf.
The position is
currently unclear on the face of the CTMR. See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 124.
The Max Planck Study proposes that, for clarity, it should be set out in both the TMD and
CTMR that exhaustion applies in relation to the entire EEA, not just the EU. Id.
12
Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799 at ¶ 4. Accord Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. v. GBUnic SA, 1999 E.C.R. I-4114, ¶ 4; see also Joined Cases C-414, 415 & 416/99, Zino
Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports, 2001 E.C.R. I-08691, ¶ 45 (clarifying that only specific
goods are exhausted–not later batches of identical or similar goods–and that the rights
owner’s unequivocal consent is required).
13
See Mylly, supra note 10, at 14.
14
Communiqué from Commissioner Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade
Mark Rights, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 7, 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
indprop/docs/tm/comexhaust_en.pdf [hereinafter Communiqué] (reporting how four
Member States supported the Commission’s ultimate decision to require EEA-wide
exhaustion, eight did not, and the remainder expressed no position); see also Council of
Eur. Union 2117th Council Meeting—Internal Mkt., Brussels, European Comm’n, at 11
(Sept. 24, 1998).
15
See NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF THE CHOICE OF REGIME OF EXHAUSTION IN THE AREA OF TRADEMARKS 2 (1999).
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The effects on pricing were predicted to be too small for it to be
worth allowing unrestricted international parallel trade.16
Although not acknowledged as such at the time, the Silhouette
judgment was also a departure from trademark function orthodoxy.
Many of the landmark CJEU exhaustion cases before the TMD and
CTMR focused on protecting a trademark’s “essential” function to
guarantee the origin of goods or services.17 That function was
particularly relevant in the exhaustion cases where separate entities
owned trademarks for the same brand in different countries and
one of them sought to prevent the import of the other’s goods into
the former’s territory. The Silhouette decision went beyond the
essential function18: it was possible to prohibit the import into the
EEA of genuine goods first put on the market outside the EEA
even if their source could be identified.19
2. Legitimate Reasons to Oppose Further Commercialization
The CJEU continued to expand the relevance of “nonessential” trademark functions in a further line of exhaustion cases
on trademark owners’ rights to oppose, for “legitimate reasons,”
the “further commercialization” of genuine goods put on the
market in the EEA.20
16

The National Economic Research Associates report showed that the impact on
prices was predicted to vary widely across different sectors, with price decreases ranging
from negligible in the drinks sectors to around two percent for consumer electronics and
domestic appliances. See id. at 27; see also Communiqué, supra note 14.
17
See, e.g., Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer
& Co., 1976 E.C.R. I-01039, ¶¶ 5–6; Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG,
1990 E.C.R. I-3711, ¶ 14.
18
The pre-eminence of the “essential” function was codified in the TMD and the
CTMR, as follows: “the function of which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as
an indication of origin.” TMD, supra note 1, recital 11; CTMR, supra note 6, recital 8.
The rights conferred by a trademark registration “cannot continue to operate if the mark
loses its commercial raison d’être, which is to create an outlet for the goods or services
that bear the sign of which it is composed, as distinct from the goods of other
undertakings.” Case C-495/07, Silberquelle GmbH v. Maselli-Strickmode GmbH, 2009
E.C.R. I-00137, ¶ 18.
19
See generally Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799. On one view, the Silhouette decision,
acknowledged that protection could extend to a guarantee of quality; the reality is that the
quality of goods sold under a particular mark may differ depending on where the goods
are sold. Id.
20
See TMD, supra note 1, art. 7(2); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 13(2).
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In the mid-1990s, it was recognized that a trademark’s function
as an indicator of quality could—in principle—justify opposing
further commercialization, albeit in limited circumstances.21 This
meant that—although necessary repackaging, relabeling and
rebranding were generally permitted—trademark owners could
nevertheless object if the alterations were of sufficiently poor
quality that their mark’s reputation might be affected.22
In later exhaustion cases, the CJEU also accepted that a
trademark’s communication, investment and advertising functions
could be relevant to preventing the on-sale in the EEA of genuine
goods.23 This has been particularly prominent in decisions
involving luxury goods, such as perfume and lingerie, where brand
owners have sought to control EEA marketing and distribution
channels.24
The argument put by luxury brand owners has been that an
impairment of the “mental condition of the goods” or of the
“allure, prestigious image and aura of luxury” should be a
legitimate reason to prevent their on-sale.25 The CJEU was not in
complete agreement. It held that—in principle—owners of marks
with a “luxurious and prestigious image” can oppose on-sale of
goods that have not been physically altered, on the basis of how
those goods are marketed.26 However, the CJEU acknowledged
that the legitimate interest of the trademark owner must be
balanced against that of the reseller in using methods customary in
21

See Joined Cases C-427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S,
1996 E.C.R. I-03514, ¶ 39.
22
See id. at ¶ 75; Case C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007
E.C.R. I-03430, ¶ 17; Case C-143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd.,
2002 E.C.R. I-03762, ¶¶ 32, 61.
23
See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior
SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013, ¶¶ 41–42. The case involved parallel imports of a
luxury perfume that were sold and advertised alongside goods of inferior quality. Id. at ¶
4. The initial view was that these functions were merely derivatives of the essential
function. See id. at ¶¶ 41–42.
24
See generally id.; see also Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA,
2009 E.C.R. I-03421.
25
Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 45; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421
at ¶¶ 24, 37 (applying the same test).
26
Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 45.
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its sector.27 Confusingly, although the CJEU initially held that a
brand owner could only succeed if the reseller’s marketing
“seriously damaged”28 the mark’s reputation, more recent case law
suggests that any damage to reputation might suffice.29 However
justified, the latter approach risks creating a two-tier EEA
exhaustion system: limited exhaustion for luxury brands, broader
exhaustion for others.
In summary, although the CJEU has laid out clear rules on (the
lack of) international exhaustion and (particularly for
pharmaceuticals) repackaging, more could be done to harmonise
how trademark law and antitrust rules on selective distribution
should interact. The past twenty years of exhaustion cases show a
shift towards legal recognition for a wide range of trademark
“functions,” and exemplify the important role of luxury marks in
shaping EU trademark law. These have also been key themes in
the EU infringement cases, to which we now turn.
B. Infringement and Relative Grounds for Registrability
Harmonizing the core rules of EU registered trademark
infringement has been more complex. This is not surprising given
the ambitions of the TMD and the CTMR. The TMD broke new
ground and expanded trademark protection in many Member
States, particularly for marks with a reputation. The CTMR, of
course, created an entirely new IP right. However, despite the
Member States’ differing starting positions, the EU has come a
long way towards harmonizing this area over the last twenty years,
as we seek to explain below.
1. Confusion vs. Association: Avoiding a Harmonized Unfair
Competition Law
One of the first challenges facing the TMD (and later the
CTMR) was how to harmonize the role of confusion in cases
where the allegedly infringing mark, and/or the goods and services
sold under it, were merely similar to the claimant’s registered
27

See id. at ¶ 44; see also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421 at ¶ 56.
Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 48.
29
Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421 at ¶¶ 55, 57 and 59. It is not clear from this case
whether the omission of the word “seriously” was deliberate.
28
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mark.30 Too broad an interpretation of “confusion” could have
protected all trademarks against unfair competition; too narrow an
interpretation might have left brand owners defenceless.
The TMD states that, “the likelihood of confusion includes the
likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.”31
Although this phrase had been inserted at the request of the
Benelux, it was at the time unclear what the reference to
“association” meant.32 With diverse Member State practices on the
point, this was one of the first major challenges for harmonizing
the infringement tests.
The Benelux view was that the resemblance between marks
was the determinative factor for infringement: confusion was not
required.33 On that basis, all marks were protected not only against
detriment that stemmed from confusion, but also harm caused by
degradation and dilution of the mark.34 But the Benelux countries
were among the few Member States advocating this approach.35 In
the UK, in contrast, Mr. Justice Laddie argued that to hold that
confusion was not required would have involved a significant
extension of trademark rights, creating “a new type of monopoly

30

See TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 8(1)(b) (refusal on
relative grounds); see also TMD, supra note 1, art 5(1)(b); CTMR, supra note 6, art.
9(1)(b) (infringement).
31
TMD, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b).
32
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG,
1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 35.
33
See Uniform Benelux Law on Marks, WIPO DATABASE OF INTELL. PROP. 1, 15 (Jan.
1, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=2899 (listing the
requirements for infringement); Case A 82/5, Henri Jullien BV v. Vershuere Norbert,
1984 E.C.C. 14; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997 E.C.R.
I-6193 at ¶¶ 35, 41; Wagamama, Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724
(U.K.).
34
Professor Gielen outlined the position under Benelux law in cross-examination in
Wagamama, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 38. The position was exemplified in the Benelux case of
Claeryn and Klarein, Case A 74/1, 1 March 1975, Jurisprudence of the Benelux Ct. of
Justice, at 472, which established protection for trademarks from dilution and denigration
in circumstances where gin was sold under the earlier mark and cleaning agent under the
infringing mark; see also Edor v. General Mills Fun, 1978 N.J. 83.
35
See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 35.
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not related to the proprietor’s trade but in the trade mark itself.”36
The European Commission also challenged the Benelux
interpretation.37 These diverging views struck at the very purpose
of trademark law. Preventing confusion has its root in protecting
the “essential” function of marks to guarantee origin and ensure a
workable trademarks register.38 Prohibiting mere association could
only be justified by recognizing broader trademark functions, such
as protecting investment.
The judicial debate was resolved by the CJEU deciding that
confusion was the appropriate benchmark.39 Association is now
only relevant insofar as it demonstrates confusion, with
“confusion” interpreted to include situations where the public is
misled into thinking that goods originate from economically or
legally linked enterprises.40 Benelux lawyers can nevertheless take
some comfort from the CJEU’s “global appreciation” test for
confusion, which allows courts to take many relevant factors into
account.41 In particular, as under pre-TMD Benelux law,42 the
CJEU has held that—as part of this “global appreciation”—the
greater the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the greater the
likelihood of confusion.43 This is a legal fiction that improves the
scope of protection for distinctive marks. In practice, it may be
that the greater a mark’s distinctiveness, the less likely the public is
36

Wagamama, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724. Germany and Austria also regarded confusion
as an essential requirement. See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997
E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 38. In those countries, confusion included confusion as to whether
undertakings were organizationally or economically linked. Id.
37
See Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 50.
38
See id. at ¶ 45.
39
See id. at ¶ 64.
40
See Case C-425/98, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-4863, ¶ 15; see
also Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I12540, ¶ 45.
41
Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1998 E.C.R. I5510, ¶ 40.
42
Case A 82/5, Henri Jullien BV v. Vershuere Norbert, 1984 E.C.C. 14. A similar
concept was suggested by the Federal Court of Justice, Germany, which referred to the
“characterizing force” of a mark, either intrinsically or by virtue of its commercial
standing. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶
11.
43
See Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, 1998 E.C.R. I-5510 at paras. 16–18. See, e.g., Marca
Mode CV, 2000 E.C.R. I-4863 at ¶¶ 41–42.
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to be confused as to origin, but the more likely an association is to
spring to mind. So, the “global appreciation” test may have
opened the door for distinctive marks (including those with a
reputation) to be protected against mere association. While this
position will be more palatable for trademark owners—the greater
the investment in their trademarks, the broader their protection—it
is an awkward fit with the “essential” function of a trademark as a
guarantee of origin.
2. Marks with a Reputation: An Unfair Competition Law for
the Rich?
Benelux trademark law has probably been most influential in
relation to EU protection for marks with a reputation. As Gielen
notes, the introduction of specific rights (against unfair advantage,
denigration and dilution) for trademarks with a reputation44 was
based on the principle of protection from prejudice under Benelux
law.45 This required a change to the national laws of many
Member States, including the UK.46
Overall, the principle of providing wider protection to marks
with a reputation has proved relatively uncontroversial. Even
though the transposition of Article 5(2) of the TMD is optional, the
only Member State not to have adopted this provision to some
extent is Cyprus.47 It seems unlikely that any other Member State
would object if—as the Max Planck Study suggests—national
trademark laws were further harmonized by making mandatory

44
See TMD, supra note 1, arts. 4(4)(a) and 5(2), CTMR, supra note 6, arts. 8(5) and
9(1)(c).
45
See Charles Gielen, Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: the First Trade
Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Council, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 262,
267 (1992).
46
See generally Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6., c. 22, § 4 (1) (Eng.). The
Trade Marks Act only protected owner’s rights where the alleged infringer used a mark
“identical with [the registered mark] or so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive
or cause confusion.” Id.
47
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 95.
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what is already an accepted norm.48 This protection is standard for
CTMs.49
The greater challenge has been to define the scope of
protection for marks with a reputation. How far should the EU
follow the Benelux in recognising that trademarks have a range of
functions, which should be protected as “valuable asset[s] in and of
[themselves]”?50 While brand owners may support broader
protection for trademark functions, some courts have seen this as a
way of creating a general unfair competition law by the back door.
a) Reputation Protected Against Identical and Similar
Infringing Goods
The additional protection for trademarks with a reputation was
drafted, in the TMD and CTMR, to apply only when the infringing
goods/services were dissimilar to those for which the mark was
registered.51 It had originally been considered—in the UK at
least—that this was because it was “difficult to imagine a situation
in which there will be no likelihood of confusion” if the infringing
goods were similar to those covered by the mark with a
reputation.52 However—in an example of Herculean interpretation
despite the clear words of the legislation—the CJEU in Davidoff v.
Gofkid held that the wider protection for marks with a reputation
also covers situations where the infringing goods/services are
identical, or similar, to those for which the mark was registered.53
48

Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 108.
50
Gielen, supra note 45, at 266.
51
See TMD, supra note 1, arts. 4(4)(a) and 5(2), CTMR, supra note 6, arts. 8(5) and
9(1)(c).
52
See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma
AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 49. Peter Prescott similarly suggested that “if a sign is so
similar that it can help to take unfair advantage/cause detriment even when used on
dissimilar goods, then it is bound to be close enough to cause origin confusion when used
on similar goods.” Peter Prescott, Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law Been Written into the
Directive?, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99, 101 (1997).
53
See Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-00389, ¶¶ 24–
26. It was confirmed in Adidas Benelux that if Article 5(2) of the TMD was implemented
at all by a Member State, then the whole of the Davidoff protection must be made
available. C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I12540, ¶ 15.
49
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In many ways, this result was unsurprising. To have held
otherwise would have left marks with a reputation less well
protected against identical or similar goods/services than against
dissimilar goods/services, especially after the CJEU’s narrow
interpretation of confusion in Sabel v. Puma.54 The CJEU clearly
considered that nonsensical, confirming the view of the referring
German Federal Court of Justice that “protection of trade marks
with a reputation seems even more justified in the case of use of a
sign for [identical or similar] goods than in a case of use for nonsimilar goods.”55 The Davidoff & Cie v. Gofkid extension has not
proved to be controversial in principle, and the Max Planck Study
has suggested that the extension should now be codified.56
However, the Davidoff & Cie v. Gofkid approach was a further
move away from the traditional protection of the “essential”
trademark function, as confusion became less relevant to marks
with a reputation. The point is particularly pertinent in cases like
L’Oréal v. Bellure, in which there was an undisputed absence of
confusion even though the infringing marks were used for identical
goods.57 However logical the extension of Article 5(2) of the
TMD, its application has caused discomfort in some Member
States, particularly where there is no general law against unfair
competition.58

54
See Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 38. The CJEU’s narrow interpretation of
confusion in Sabel had an impact on subsequent cases; see, e.g., Davidoff, 2003 E.C.R. I00389 at ¶ 30.
55
Davidoff, 2003 E.C.R. I-00389 at ¶ 12. The CJEU suggested that it had not been
seriously disputed that protection against identical or similar goods and services must be
at least as extensive as that against dissimilar goods and services. See id. at ¶¶ 25–26.
56
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 107–08. The United Kingdom Trade Marks Act
1994, implementing the TMD, has already been amended to take account of this decision.
See id. at 107–08.
57
See generally Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185.
58
The Manual Concerning Opposition Part 5: Trade Marks with Reputation Article
8(5) CTMR, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 1, 8,
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/CTM/legalReferences/partc_tm_reputa
tion.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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b) Unfair Advantage Broadened; Dilution Narrowed—Or
Is It?
It might have been expected that the standard for establishing
each of unfair advantage, denigration and dilution would be
materially similar, given that they are all ways of protecting marks
with a reputation. However, that is not the case under the CJEU’s
current jurisprudence. Instead, brand owners have been left with
the upper hand in unfair advantage cases, and with an uncertain,
uphill struggle in dilution cases. This has resulted from the
CJEU’s haphazard extension of protection for “additional”
trademark functions.
i. Dilution
It is currently very difficult for EU trademark owners to
establish infringement by dilution. The CJEU has held that this
often requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of
consumers, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur.59
This is almost impossible to demonstrate, making EU anti-dilution
protection of limited use. In contrast, under U.S. law a famous
trademark is generally protected against dilution “regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition,
or of actual economic injury.”60
Some hope for Europe comes from a recent General Court
decision, in which it was held that trademark owners do not need
to prove a change, or likely change, in the economic behaviour of
consumers to demonstrate dilution.61 Instead, the General Court
held that dilution could be demonstrated if a mark’s ability to
identify origin had been “weakened.”62 Given the conflict with the
CJEU’s previous reasoning, this is unlikely to be the end of the
matter.

59

Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. Inc v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. I-08823,

¶ 77.
60

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2(1) (2006).
See Case T-570/10, Envtl. Mfg. L.L.P. v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal
Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 53, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 6201TJ0570 (May 22, 2012) (not yet reported).
62
Id. at ¶ 54 (interpreting CTMR art. 8(5)).
61

LON24195639 (DO NOT DELETE)

746

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/18/2013 2:27 PM

[Vol. 23:731

However unsatisfactory this uncertainty, the Max Planck Study
has not proposed changing the status quo, so legislative
intervention in the short term seems unlikely.
The only
consolation for brand owners is that, in some circumstances,
“unfair advantage” infringement is as easy to prove as dilution is
difficult.63
ii. Unfair Advantage
“Unfair advantage” has been interpreted particularly broadly
by the CJEU. The key case, L’Oréal v. Bellure, involved the sale
of budget perfumes that deliberately looked and smelled similar to
their market-leading counterparts.64 Both parties accepted that
neither traders nor consumers were likely to be misled.65 There
was also no evidence that sales of the L’Oréal goods had been
affected, or that the L’Oréal marks had suffered reputational
tarnish or dilution.66
Nevertheless, following a “global
assessment,” the CJEU held that Bellure was likely to have taken
unfair advantage of L’Oréal’s marks.67 It was unlawful for Bellure
to “ride on the coat-tails” of L’Oréal’s marks to benefit from and
exploit their power of attraction, reputation, prestige, and the
marketing effort invested.68 This was true irrespective of whether
any harm was caused to the marks themselves.69
This expansive approach to unfair advantage—which merely
paid lip service to the term “unfair”—came close to continental
concepts of unfair competition by “parasitism.”70 This troubled
many commentators, including the referring court itself. Lord
Justice Jacob, in his reluctant implementation of the CJEU

63
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 108. The ease of establishing unfair advantage
contributed to the Max Planck Study’s conclusion that changes to dilution law were not
required. See id.
64
Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 17.
65
Id. at ¶ 18.
66
Id. at ¶ 30.
67
Id. at ¶¶ 44–45, 48.
68
Id. at ¶ 49.
69
Id. at ¶ 50.
70
Id. at ¶ 41.
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decision, lamented the CJEU’s failure to differentiate between
“permissible free riding” and “impermissible free riding.”71
It is perhaps no surprise that the English courts have been
willing to narrow the potential ambit of L’Oréal v. Bellure.
Shortly afterwards, in Whirlpool v. Kenwood, the English Court of
Appeal held that it was insufficient to show that the defendant had
merely obtained an advantage; “there must be an added factor” to
make that advantage unfair.72
Unfairness could not be
demonstrated in that case, where the defendant had its own wellestablished brand and goodwill, did not need to ride on the
claimant’s coat-tails, and would have been reluctant to be seen to
be doing so.73 It seems to have been key that Kenwood did not
intend to imitate Whirlpool’s mark.
It is difficult to reconcile the CJEU’s broad position in L’Oréal
v. Bellure74 with the principles articulated by the English Court of
Appeal in Whirlpool v. Kenwood.75 However, in Interflora v.
Marks & Spencer, the CJEU took a different approach, expanding
on the meaning of the phrase “without due cause.”76 The CJEU
clarified that use that “falls . . . within the ambit of fair
competition” will not be “without ‘due cause,’” and so will not
infringe.77 This means, for example, that unfair advantage is
particularly likely to be demonstrated where the goods are
imitations, as use of the trademark will not be within the “ambit of
fair competition.”78 As such, the outcome on the facts—if not the
reasoning—in Whirlpool v. Kenwood can be made to fit with
CJEU case law.79
71

L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535, ¶ 49 (Eng.).
Whirlpool Corp. v. Kenwood Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 753, [136] (Eng.).
73
Conversely, where intention was evident, courts have more readily found
infringement of the reputation provisions, even where the infringer already had its own
reputation. See, e.g., Specsavers Int’l Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd., [2012] EWCA
(Civ) 24, [164].
74
2009 E.C.R. I-05185.
75
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 753, [136].
76
Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., [2012] E.T.M.R. 1, ¶ 91
(referencing TMD, art. 5(2); CTMR, art. 9(1)(c)).
77
Id.
78
Id. at ¶¶ 90–91; Case C-236/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA,
2010 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 102, 103.
79
See MELLOR, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 9-137, 9-141.
72
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One key question for the future is how far EU trademark law
should protect against free riding.80 Increased emphasis on the
phrase “without due cause” suggests that there are limits to the
scope of unfair advantage, but leaves open the possibility of an
amorphous judge-made law against unfair competition.81 To date,
there seems to be little legislative interest in clarifying this area of
law.82 However, given the potential for EU disharmony on the
point, it should be a strong candidate for legislative review over the
next five to ten years.
3. Double Identity
The protection of marks with a reputation is not alone in
requiring reform. The TMD and CTMR each purport to provide
absolute protection against the use in trade of a sign that is
identical to a registered trademark, where it is used for identical
goods or services.83 A relatively simple provision on its face, the
test for this double-identity infringement has caused significant
legal uncertainty.
A decade ago, the CJEU held that claimants must demonstrate
that one of the functions of a mark had been affected before
infringement would be found.84 So, even where a mark was used
on identical goods, the trademark owner would still have to show
that a trademark function was harmed.85 This was uncontroversial
in counterfeit cases, where the origin function would always be
engaged, but has caused judicial contortions where other functions
had to be relied on.86

80

L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, [27].
Id. at [139]–[141].
82
See, e.g., Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC) (discussing similar concepts
but failing to address this issue).
83
See TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a) (infringment), art. 5(1)(a) (rights conferred by
trademark); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 8(1)(a) (relative grounds for refusal), art. 9(1)(a)
(rights conferred by Community trade mark).
84
See Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶¶ 51–
54; Case C-48/05, Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017, paras. 21–22.
85
Adam Opel, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017 at ¶ 24.
86
L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, [28]–[29].
81
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The issue has been most acute in the recent proliferation of
comparative advertising cases, where defendants refer to registered
trademarks—as online keywords, for example—to advertise
competing goods.87
As discussed above, in L’Oréal v. Bellure the reliance on nonessential trademark functions led to very broad protection against
“unfair” competition.88 The defendants had also used L’Oréal’s
registered word marks in comparison lists shown to retailers.89
The CJEU held that this would infringe the double identity
provisions if any trademark function—including an “additional”
function such as investment, communication, or advertising—had
been adversely affected.90
This creep of functions analysis prompted a judicial backlash
in the UK.91 Implementing L’Oréal v. Bellure, Lord Justice Jacob
made it clear that he would have preferred to find the comparison
lists lawful, as they only involved “making honest statements about
their products where those products are themselves lawful.”92 He
criticised the “[c]onceptually . . . vague and ill-defined”93 nature of
the “additional” functions, arguing that, once it was established
that there was no risk of confusion, the consumer’s interest lay in
free competition.94 The CJEU, he suggested, had “muzzled” the
defendants, perhaps even breaching their right to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.95
Even though Lord Justice Jacob’s reservations were shared by
the European Commission in relation to keywords,96 the CJEU has
87

See, e.g., Case C-236/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010
E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 69–73.
88
Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 65.
89
Id. at ¶ 21.
90
Id. at ¶ 55–58.
91
See, e.g., L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535.
92
Id. at paras. 8, 39.
93
Id. at ¶ 30.
94
See id. at ¶¶ 16–18 (quoting L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968,
[28] and various law journal articles).
95
Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10.
96
See, e.g., Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., 2012 E.T.M.R. 1,
¶ 38; see also Interflora v. Marks & Spencer No.2 [2010] EWHC 925 (Ch), ¶ 18.
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confirmed that the L’Oréal v. Bellure reasoning applies in that
context.97 Nevertheless, the CJEU’s analysis of the keywords
cases means that L’Oréal v. Bellure is unlikely to affect their
outcome.98 Having accepted that all functions are relevant, the
CJEU back-pedalled by adding a new layer to the double-identity
test: the keyword use would—in practice—have to confuse the
average internet user as to the origin of the goods/services for there
to be infringement.99 The CJEU has also suggested that use of a
keyword of itself would not affect the advertising function even if
the brand owner has to pay a higher “price per click” to promote its
adverts.100
The Max Planck Study sums up this position by concluding
that “referential” uses have not been integrated clearly and
consistently into the EU legislation.101 This is likely in part
because of the CJEU’s desire to find infringement in novel
scenarios where the “essential” function is not compromised.102 In
one of the few major changes it proposes to the substantive law,
the study suggests that the TMD and the CTMR Preambles should
be revised to clarify that “referential” uses of registered marks can
lead to infringement, but that such uses should be treated
separately to use of the registered mark in relation to “the alleged
infringer’s own goods and services.”103 The study suggests that
analyzing “additional” trademark functions is inappropriate in
“referential” cases.104 Instead, the same result should be achieved
by explicitly permitting “referential” uses, provided that they are in
accordance with “honest business practices” and fall within clearly
97

See Case C-326/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I___, ¶¶ 69–71; Interflora, 2012 E.T.M.R. 1 at ¶¶ 34–35.
98
See generally Interflora, 2012 E.T.M.R. 1.
99
Google Fr. SARL, 2010 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶ 99.
100
Id. at ¶¶ 94–95, 98; see also Ilanah Simon Fhima, The Court of Justice’s Protection
of the Advertising Function of Trade Marks: an (Almost) Sceptical Analysis, 6 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAC. 325 (2001) (examining CJEU’s exploration of the advertising function
little impact on the outcome of cases).
101
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 122.
102
Max Planck Study, supra note 5 at 103–04. See, e.g., Case C-487/07 L’Oréal SA v.
Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 65.
103
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 122.
104
Id.

LON24195639 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

EU TRADEMARK HARMONIZATION

3/18/2013 2:27 PM

751

articulated defences, which might include a new defence of
“honest referential use.”105 That would create judicial breathing
space for the traditional double identity cases, for which—as
Article 16.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)106 notes—confusion should
not be in issue.
C. Going Forward
In summary, the harmonization of substantive EU trademark
law over the last 20 years has been largely successful.
Nevertheless, as technology has offered new ways to compete,
harmonization efforts have, at times, struggled to keep up. Recent
attempts to rely on trademarks’ “communication, advertising, [and]
investment” functions have, unfortunately, risked jettisoning the
legal certainty107 that is assumed to be crucial to the EU’s ecommerce agenda.
The Max Planck Study proposes that the purpose and scope of
trademark protection, including a full account of all protected
functions, be outlined in the Preambles to the TMD and CTMR.108
This would certainly be a good start. The EU might also consider

105
Id. at 115, 121–24. The Max Planck Study proposes that business practices that are
not honest under Article 6 of the TMD and Article 12 of the CTMR be clarified as
meaning any use of a sign that creates the impression of a link, “affects the reputation or
distinctive character of the mark or . . . discredits or denigrates the mark.” Id. The
position put forth in the study is complicated by the interrelation between the TMD,
CTMR, and the Comparative Advertising Directive of December 12, 2006 (“CAD”).
Council Directive 06/114, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 21 (EU). The expansive interpretation of
Articles 4(g) and 4(f) CAD in L’Oréal means that the TMD and CTMR defences are not
available if imitations or replicas are involved. L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA
(Civ) 535 [37] (Eng.). An overhaul of the CAD itself would be required before such uses
were permitted. Although outside the scope of the Max Planck Study, one of its authors,
Annette Kur, has also suggested Article 4(g) CAD should be deleted. See Annette Kur,
The Institute of Brand and Innovation Law Lecture, Trade Marks: The Future of the
Advertising Function, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 5
(Mar. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/ibil/docs/11_brands_kur.pdf. It
appears that Lord Justice Jacob would also favour such a development. See L’Oréal SA v.
Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 [37] (Eng.).
106
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS], Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
107
See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 103.
108
Id. at 105, 114–16.
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reviewing the extent to which unfair competition laws, including
the EU’s unregistered trademark protection, merit harmonization.
The registered trademark infringement cases still show significant
potential for diverging trademark philosophies. Until the EU can
articulate the purposes of modern trademarks with greater clarity,
and agree on the extent to which those purposes should benefit
from legal protection, we can still expect national courts to offer
their view of what the CJEU really means. However far the
harmonization of substantive EU trademark law has come, even
the Max Planck Study leaves the next generation with plenty to
think about.
II. CTM UNITARY PROTECTION AND PAN-EU REMEDIES
The harmonization of substantive trademark law, which was
initiated by the TMD in 1988, is only part of the story. In
particular, the TMD and the CTMR left the harmonization of
procedural, evidence and enforcement rules on the back-burner.109
This, in turn, left open questions that go to the core of whether a
CTM is a unitary right, with equal effect across the whole EU.110
To illustrate the difficulties that this has caused in practice, we
discuss below three evidence- or enforcement-related issues that
have the potential to undermine the purpose of the CTM system.
First, we consider where a CTM should be used to sustain
registration. Secondly, we look at the impact this has had on the
cluttered CTM register and co-existence with other national marks
and CTMs.
Thirdly, in cases where a CTM court has
“international” jurisdiction,111 we discuss whether the CTM owner
is entitled to a pan-EU injunction. We conclude by considering
whether the EU is ready for a more fundamental shift: using the
CTM regime as a replacement for all national marks.

109

For example, the CTMR acknowledged that “[o]n all matters not covered by this
Regulation a Community trade mark court shall apply its national law.” Council
Regulation 207/2009, art. 101, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 24 (EC).
110
Id. at art. 1(2).
111
See id. at art. 97–98.
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A. Where Must a CTM be Used: EU Co-Existence
The increased use of CTMs and the EU expansion have led to
difficult questions. First, to what extent is use of the CTM in a
small geographical area, even just one Member State, sufficient to
demonstrate “genuine use in the Community” and so prevent a
CTM from being revocable?112 Secondly, if CTMs can be
sustained by use within a small geographical area, should
restrictions be placed on the registration of similar marks
elsewhere in the EU, even where there is no prospect of
commercial conflict?
1. Where Must a CTM be Used?
The first point remains open following the CJEU’s decision in
Leno Merken v. Hagelkruis Beheer.113
Advocate-General
Sharpston’s opinion in that case proposed that use in only one
Member State may be sufficient, although it is not necessarily
so.114 She considered the relevant geographical area to be the
entire territory of the internal market.115 Accordingly, all forms of
use within this area should be examined on a case-by-case basis in
order to determine whether the use “is sufficient to maintain or
create market share” and contribute to a “commercially relevant
presence” in the internal market: “The borders between Member
States and the respective sizes of their territories are not pertinent
to this enquiry.”116 However, “use of a mark on a website that is
accessible in all of the 27 Member States is not,” of itself,
necessarily enough.117 The CJEU came to a similar conclusion. In
particular, it agreed that territorial borders should be disregarded in
assessing whether a CTM has been put to genuine use in the EU.
112

See id. at art. 15
Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, 2012 E.C.R. I-___
(delivered 19 December 2012) (not yet reported). Note: The decision of the Benelux
Trade Mark Office provided that the use in one Member State should not “by definition”
constitute use in the Community, particularly in the light of an expanded EU.
114
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v.
Hagelkruis Beheer BV, 2012 E.C.R. I-___ (delivered July 5, 2012) (not yet reported), at
¶¶ 39, 55, 64.
115
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id at ¶ 39.
116
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id. at ¶¶ 48–50 (emphasis omitted).
117
See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id. at ¶ 55.
113
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Although the test is rather vague, it seems to be a good fit with
the previous approaches taken by the CJEU, the General Court and
OHIM, and with the principle of unitary character.118 The Max
Planck Study also recommends that the requisite nature and extent
of use of a CTM—both territorial and otherwise—should be
determined on a case by case basis,119 and that the analysis should
entirely disregard whether there is use across the boundaries of
Member States.120 The corresponding finding by the CJEU should
be reasonably good news for trademark owners: at the very least,
they should not be required to show use in every EU country.
Registration of one CTM will enable trademark owners to build up
their brand in part of Europe, while reserving the right to roll out
use of the mark across the continent at a later date.
2. Co-Existence Challenges
There is a concern, though, that this liberalization of the ability
to maintain CTMs will lead to a cluttered register. It could also
unnecessarily curtail uses of similar marks in Member States
where there will, in practice, be no commercial conflict. This is
especially true across as wide and culturally diverse an area as the
EU.
To facilitate co-existence in these circumstances, EU law
prevents the owners of both national marks and CTMs from
objecting to use of a later registered mark if they have acquiesced
118

See Case C-40/01, Ansul BV v. Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV, 2003 E.C.R. I-2439;
Case C-259/02, La Mer Tech. Inc. v. Laboratoires Goemar SA, 2004 E.C.R. I-1159; Case
C-416/04, Sunrider Corp. v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade
Marks and Designs), 2006 E.C.R. I-4237; see also Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at
133. The Advocate General’s approach in Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV
also fits with the CJEU’s previous finding in Case C-301/07 PAGO Int’l GmbH v.
Tiromilch registrierte Genossenschaft mbH that a dilution claim could be founded on the
basis of a CTM’s reputation in only one EU Member State, although the Advocate
General specifically stated that this reasoning could not be transposed directly to the
question of genuine use. Compare Leno Merken, with Case C-301/07, PAGO Int’l
GmbH v. Tirolmilch Registrierte Genossenschaft mbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429.
119
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 139. The Max Planck Study proposes that
relevant factual circumstances should include the nature of the goods and services, the
sector, and the size and type of the business activities. Id. at 139–40.
120
See id. at 135.
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in the use of the later mark for five successive years.121
Acquiescence offers some respite, but provides no immediate
certainty for the owners of later marks. The authors of the Max
Planck Study propose that the EU should go one step further by
forcing legislative co-existence between CTMs and later national
marks in certain narrowly defined circumstances (and without any
need to show acquiescence).122 To protect the unitary character of
the CTM, the CTM owner could still expand use of the CTM into
the relevant Member State at a later date, but the right to oppose
use of the national mark would be curtailed.
It is still unclear whether the European Commission will act on
this particular recommendation. However, the proposals outlined
in the Max Planck Study do at least put on the agenda one of the
major problems that the EU is likely to face in the years to come:
balancing its desire to improve the appeal of CTMs against
preventing the register from becoming unworkable. It may be that
forced co-existence will not unduly concern most CTM owners.
However, it will operate as yet another limitation on the general
principle that relief from infringement should be available on an
EU-wide basis for all CTMs. We turn now to the problems this
has caused in a related area: the availability of pan-EU remedies
when linguistic differences mean that a defendant’s mark may not
infringe on a pan-EU basis.

121

CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 54(1). See also TMD, supra note 1, at art. 9(1). The
application for registration must have been made in good faith and the owner of the
earlier trademark must know that the later trademark has been registered and used after
its registration. See id. Registration of the earlier trademark is not necessary for the
running of the five-year period. See id. (“where there has been a long period of honest
concurrent use of those two trademarks where . . . that use neither has nor is liable to
have an adverse effect on the essential function of the trade mark”). Case C-482/09
Budějovický Budvar, národní podnik v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 84
(delivered Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported).
122
Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 136–39. To keep the operation of this forced coexistence within justifiable limits, the Max Planck Study proposes: (i) that the CTM must
have been used only on a minimal basis and in a part of the Community remote from the
relevant Member State, (ii) that sufficient time (fifteen years) is allowed to establish
wider use, and (iii) that the later national mark must have been applied for in good faith.
Good faith might be impossible to demonstrate where the relevant market sector was so
small that minor activities would have an EU-wide impact. Id.
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B. Barriers to pan-EU relief
The Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive123 has
harmonized some of the basic EU IP infringement remedies, but
we are yet to receive clear judicial guidance on whether the CTM
offers truly unitary remedies in the EU. Unitary rights are of
limited use without unitary remedies.124 For this reason, a CTM
court in the Member State in which a claim is properly brought has
“jurisdiction in respect of: acts of infringement committed or
threatened within the territory of any of the Member States.”125 In
principle, therefore, injunctions issued by a CTM court against
infringement of a CTM should be capable of extending across the
entire EU.126
Unfortunately, the principle of pan-EU jurisdiction is
complicated by the wide linguistic divergence within the EU.127
The difficulty is that trademarks are only protected under EU law
to the extent that their legally recognised functions are affected.128
The use of a later mark across the EU might affect the functions of
a CTM in some EU countries, but not others. This is most likely to
occur where the infringement arises from confusion caused by the
similar pronunciation of the two marks in one or more languages,
but where the two marks are pronounced differently in other
languages. For example, on this approach, a mark might infringe
the “essential function” of a CTM in Germany, because local
123

Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EU).
The CTMR recognizes this, stating that rights owners should be able “by means of
one procedural system [to] obtain Community trade marks to which uniform protection is
given and which produce their effects throughout the entire area of the Community.”
CTMR, supra note 6, at Recital (3), Recital (16), art. 1(2).
125
See CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 98(1)(a) (emphasis added). But see id. at arts.
97(5), 98(1) CTMR (noting that this rule does not apply where jurisdiction is founded on
the place where the infringement occurred).
126
Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v. Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶
44 (delivered Apr. 12, 2011) (not yet reported).
127
European Commission, Speaking for Europe: Languages in the European Union, at
7 (2008), available at ec.europa.eu/education/languages/pdf/doc3275_en.pdf. The EU is
comprised of twenty-seven Member States with more than twenty official languages (not
to mention sixty regional and minority languages). Id.
128
See, e.g., Google Fr. SARL, 2010 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 75–79; DHL Express France,
2011 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶ 46.
124
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pronunciation leads to a likelihood of confusion. However, the
same mark might not infringe in France where it is pronounced
differently. In such cases, the CJEU has suggested that use of the
later mark should only be prohibited in those Member States in
which confusion would arise.129 Arguably, the notoriety of the
mark could also be relevant, especially if the trademark owner has
taught the relevant public how to pronounce the mark.
This significantly curtails the unitary character of CTMs.
Defendants who use their mark across the EU can now force
claimants to establish infringement in each official language—a
tall order that may price many trademark proprietors out of
enforcing their rights in multiple countries. The alternative may
have its disadvantages (for example, it might feel like rough justice
to grant a pan-EU injunction to the extent that confusion is limited
to only a few Member States) but it is surely more in line with
trademark owners’ expectations from a supposedly unitary CTM
system. This is a difficult policy question for the EU, but ought to
be resolved if trademark applicants are expected to be able to
assess the true value of seeking CTMs rather than national marks.
C. Replacement of National Marks
Proposals for the harmonization of national trademark law and
the introduction of CTMs were made around the same time, back
in 1980.130 In the end, it was the TMD that came first, as
harmonizing national laws was seen as a necessary first step to
enable the establishment of a CTM system.131 Has the time now
come to take the final leap and remove national marks altogether?
Would this even be desirable?
We suggest not. At a time when the concern is to de-clutter the
register, forcing CTM registrations when national registrations
would suffice seems to be a move in the wrong direction.132 From
a brand owner’s perspective, there may also be tactical reasons for
registering national marks. For example, applying for national
129

DHL Express France, 2011 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶¶ 46–48.
Proposal for a First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Trade Marks, COM (1980) 635 Final (Nov. 19, 1980).
131
See Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, supra note 4, ¶ 1-004.
132
See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 270.
130
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registrations avoids having to manage potentially conflicting marks
in countries that are not of commercial interest. A split system will
also mean that national marks continue to be assessed on their
merits by the trademark institutions that are closest to them. For
example, the CJEU recently confirmed that the validity of earlier
national marks can only be challenged in national proceedings.133
This means that the General Court cannot hold that an earlier
national trademark lacks distinctive character. For now, at least,
the advantages of a dual system continue to outweigh the
disadvantages—particularly if the issues outlined above can be
resolved.
III. THE EU TRADEMARK INSTITUTIONS
Over the last twenty years the trademark-related caseload of
the EU institutions has grown considerably. In part a natural
consequence of the TMD and the CTMR, this growth has also been
spurred on by self-promotion from OHIM. The result has been
increased pressure on EU judicial capacity. Unfortunately,
however, the appetite to resolve the capacity squeeze remains
relatively modest. This section outlines the rise of the EU
trademark institutions over the past twenty years, and considers
whether the next twenty years will herald a more radical shake up:
a specialised central EU trademark court.
A. Increasing Caseloads: the Facts
As is apparent from sections II and III above, the EU judicial
institutions have been kept busy with requests to interpret EU
trademark law. The statistics set out below show a dramatic rise in
the amount of court and registry time devoted to trademarks. In
particular:

133

Case C-196/11 P, Formula One Licensing BV v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 38 (delivered May 24,
2012) (not yet reported).
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the number of new CTM applications at OHIM has
more than doubled since the mid-1990s;134



the CJEU and the General Court have, respectively,
37% and 109% more new cases each year than they did
ten years ago;135 and
 over that period, the number of new IP cases started
each year has more than doubled for the CJEU, and is
almost five times higher for the General Court.136
The number of CJEU and General Court judges has lagged
behind this growing caseload. The only additional judicial
appointments have been made when a new country joined the
EU.137 This constraint on judicial capacity could lead to
significant delays in access to justice. The figures speak for
themselves.
1. OHIM
In the past few years, OHIM processed approximately 100,000
CTM applications annually, up from just fewer than 44,000 in
1996.138 There are likely to be several reasons for the uptake of the
CTM. Firstly, following the reduction of CTM e-filing application
fees, OHIM received almost 20% more CTM applications in 2006
134

See Statistics of Community Trade Marks 2012, Overview: Applications, OFFICE OF
IN
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET,
1
(Mar.
9,
2012),
HARMONIZATION
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/OHIM/statistics/ssc009-statistics_
of_community_trade_marks_2012.pdf [hereinafter CTM Statistics] (on 4 December 2012
99,254 applications for 2012 had been reported, but based on the previous two years this
total will most likely reach over 100,000).
135
See id. Statistics for the past ten years are based on the authors’ aggregation of
available data. The increased workload of the courts is not just due to trademarks. The
EU’s judicial institutions have also had to cope with EU expansion and a wider
jurisdictional remit, including under REACH, the EU’s chemicals regime.
136
See id.
137
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010
O.J. (C 83) 13, 27, art. 19(2). There must be one judge from each Member State in the
CJEU and at least one judge from each Member State in the General Court (and since the
General Court’s creation it has had only one judge per Member State). Id. The new
appointments equated to an eighty percent increase in the number of judges over this tenyear period. The History of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
138
See CTM Statistics, supra note 134, at 1 (demonstrating that there were 105,900
CTM applications in 2011 and 98,343 CTM applications in 2010).
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than in 2005.139 The percentage of applications filed electronically
increased from 30% to 70% in that year.140 Secondly, the EU (as a
combined market) has become a more attractive place to do
business, particularly since the harmonization of certain ecommerce laws in the late 1990s141 and early 2000s.142 For
European companies and foreign investors, the CTM offers a
convenient and cost-effective one-stop shop that protects their
brands. Thirdly, when the European Community joined the
Madrid Protocol in 2004, it became even easier to apply for CTMs
and to use the CTM as a basis for other applications.143
Inevitably, this increased interest in the CTM has had
tremendous effects for the caseload of the General Court and the
CJEU.
2. The General Court
In 2011, the General Court had an influx of over 300 more new
cases than in 2000 (see inset graph).144

139

OHIM, European Trademarks and Designs Newsletter 10 (November 2006),
available at http://www.oami.europa.eu/en/office/newsletter/06012.htm#ED1.
140
See CTM Statistics, supra note 134, at 1–2; OHIM Annual Report 2007, TRADE
MARKS AND DESIGN REGISTRATION OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 13 (2007),
http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/press/pdf/AR2.pdf.
141
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997
on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts.
142
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market. See OHIM, European Trademarks and Designs
Newletter, supra note 139 at 1.1 (“A Look Back at OHIM in 2006”); see, e.g, Véronique
Musson, Finding its Feet: 10 Years of OHIM Practice, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 15
(Sept.–Oct. 2006) (describing the success of the EU system within the last decade).
143
See Musson, supra note 142, at 19.
144
Compare Bo Vesterdorf, Proceedings of the Court of First Instance in 2000, 1
(2000), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/tp2000_200809-30_16-26-3_988.pdf (statistics concerning the judicial activity for the Court of First
Instance in 2000), with Annual Report 2011, CVRIA 1, 194 (2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201206/ra2011_version_integrale_en.pdf [hereinafter Annual Report 2011] (statistics
concerning the judicial activity for the General Court in 2011). See generally Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (renaming the Court of First
Instance, the General Court in 2007).
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Intellectual Property cases have accounted for about a third of the
General Court’s workload since 2006.145
In 2002 and 2006, the number of new IP cases entering the
General Court increased significantly.146 The 2002 increase can
probably be attributed to the Community Designs Regulation,
which came into force the year before.147 In 2006, coinciding with
OHIM’s reduced CTM e-filing fees (see above), there were 45%
more appeals from OHIM to the General Court.148
3. The CJEU
The story has been similar at the CJEU. In 2011, the CJEU
had 185 more new cases than in 2000 (see inset graph, next
page).149
145

Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 194.
See Statistics Concerning the Judicial Activity of the Court of First Instance, 173
(2002),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-10/st02tr.pdf;
Statistics Concerning the Judicial Activity of the Court of First Instance, 173 (2006),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/06_trib_stat_2008-0929_13-32-40_772.pdf. In 2005 and 2006, the overall number of new cases in the General
Court was less than in previous years. Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 211. This
may have been due to the introduction of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2005. See Council
Directive 04/752, 2004 O.J. (L 333) 7 (EU).
147
Council Regulation 6/2002/EC of 12 December 2001.
148
Board of Appeal Statistics, (Sept. 2012) 1, 2, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/
resource/documents/OHIM/statistics/appeal_stats_2012.pdf.
149
Compare Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 95, with Statistics of Judicial
Activity of the Court of Justice (2000), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/
docs/application/pdf/2008-10/st00tr.pdf.
146
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A significant amount of that increase was due to IP, and—in
particular—trademark cases.
The rising number of CJEU trademark cases has been driven
by many factors, including the willingness of national courts to
make preliminary references and of trademark owners to appeal
General Court decisions. References show little signs of slowing
down, particularly as national courts rarely characterise the
trademark effects of new technologies as acte clair.150 The CJEU
is at least trying to discourage unnecessary appeals from the
General Court, with recent CJEU decisions confirming the CJEU’s
reluctance to interfere with the General Court’s findings of fact.151
The scope of an appeal to the CJEU is now clearly limited to errors
of law152 or the other narrow grounds set out in the CTMR.153

150

See generally Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., [2012]
E.T.M.R. 1; Joined Cases 236 & 238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-___; Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin BV,
2010 E.C.R. I-6959.
151
See Case C-100/11, Helena Rubinstein SNC v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 84 (delivered May 12,
2012) (not yet reported).
152
See Case C-196/11, Formula One Licensing BV v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Market ((Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 56–57 (delivered
May 24, 2012) (not yet reported).
153
CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 65.
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B. Taking the Strain: Can the EU’s Institutions Cope with their
Caseload?
The increasing trademark caseload raises questions about
whether the EU’s trademark systems are still fit for purpose.
1. OHIM
Over the past eighteen years, OHIM has worked hard to
improve the desirability and accessibility of the CTM. As outlined
above, those efforts include reducing filing fees, introducing
electronic applications, dealing with EU expansion, and joining the
Madrid Protocol.
The reception of this success story has, at times, been mixed.
On the positive side, significant improvements have been made to
the speed of OHIM decisions.154 OHIM’s current Service Charter,
a clear statement of its priorities, even includes timeliness
targets.155 However, concerns remain about whether achieving
these targets might prejudice the quality and consistency of
decisions.156 Even with examiners following detailed guidelines,
there is a risk that certain CTM examinations will miss the nuances
of EU trademark law.
If the CTM system is to succeed for the next twenty years, the
right balance must be struck between CTM examination speed and
the number of cases that need to be appealed. There is also a more
fundamental question: who should be the ultimate gatekeeper for
CTM applications? The current pace and frequency with which
CTM applications are granted,157 along with the growing number
of General Court and CJEU trademark cases, suggests that OHIM
is a relatively light filter. The General Court and, to a lesser
extent, the CJEU, are frequently required to step in.
154

See Rhys Morgan, Ensuring Greater Legal Certainty in OHIM Decision-Taking by
Abandoning Legal Formalism, 7 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 408, 408 (2012); Edward
Fennell, Leaving a Legacy, 27 INTELL. PROP. REV. 32, 32 (2009).
155
See generally Timeliness Service Standards 2012, OFFICE OF HARMONIZATION FOR
THE
INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS & DESIGNS) (May 8, 2012),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/QPLUS/serviceCharter/serviceCharter.en.do.
156
Morgan, supra note 154, at 408.
157
According to statistics published on OHIM’s website, nearly ninety percent of CTM
applications in 2011 were granted.
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There are signs that the CJEU would like OHIM to take greater
responsibility for the accuracy of examinations. For example, the
CJEU has recently affirmed that OHIM examiners must take into
account decisions on previous, similar applications in order to
ensure consistency and legal certainty.158 Of itself, though, this is
unlikely to deter sophisticated trademark owners from appealing
adverse CTM examination decisions, especially as appeal costs
remain relatively low.159
What is needed, we suggest, is a three-pronged approach.
First, OHIM’s processes need to be robust enough to give
applicants the confidence that examination decisions will be
consistent and in line with EU trademark law. That may result in
increased OHIM fees, but it is appropriate for this cost be met by
trademark applicants rather than the EU taxpayers who fund
appeals to the General Court and CJEU.160 Secondly, the General
Court needs to increase its capacity and expertise to hear appeals
from the OHIM Board of Appeal, as we set out in more detail in
the next sub-section. Thirdly, trademark examination appeals to
the CJEU should be available to rights owners only in rare cases.
2. The General Court and the CJEU
The statistics set out above, and the trademark support needed
by OHIM, suggest that the current workload pressures on the
General Court and CJEU are unlikely to subside without
intervention. The issue is most acute for the General Court but
there are also capacity concerns at the CJEU.161

158

See, e.g., Case C-51/10 P, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp z o.o. v. Office for
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶
74 (delivered Mar. 10, 2011) (not yet reported).
159
See List of Fees Following Commission Regulation (EC) No 355/2009 of 31 March
2009, Office for Harmonization of the Internal Market (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/feesPayment/listFees.en.do.
160
Under the CTMR, OHIM retains largely autonomous budget control, funded
principally by users’ fees. See Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L78) 1, 2 (EC).
161
See Commission Opinion on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the European Union, presented by the Court, at paras. 28–29, COM
(2011) 596 final (Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Commission Opinion]. See also Draft
Amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I
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There are at least three ways to ease the pressure:
 Create a specialized trademark court to replace
the General Court;
 Create specialized trademark chambers at the
General Court and/or the CJEU; or
 Alter the existing composition, structure and/or
procedures of the General Court and/or the
CJEU.
It seems likely that the EU will adopt a hybrid of the second
and third options.
The EU Commission and the CJEU have recently decided
against creating a specialist trademark tribunal, primarily because
it would not reduce the current backlog of cases quickly enough.162
This reasoning, however logical, seems to be driven more by
necessity than forward-planning.
Instead, the EU Commission’s proposed solution is to increase
the number of General Court judges by twelve to thirty-nine and to
allow the creation of specialised chambers.163 This should at least
give certain judges an opportunity to focus more on trademark law.
However, it stops short of creating a specialist IP or trademark
court with its own rules tailored to IP cases. A more modest
expansion of the CJEU’s judiciary is also likely, combined with
some minor procedural changes. The EU Commission (at the
CJEU’s instigation) recommends increasing the number of judges
in the Grand Chamber from thirteen to fifteen and appointing a
Vice President to assist the President.164 Unfortunately, the
evidence suggests that these tweaks are unlikely to go far enough.
For example, the UK House of Lords European Union Committee
has suggested that the maximum increase in efficiency that is
possible to achieve from procedural change has already

Thereto, 1, 2 (Mar. 28 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2011-04/projet_en.pdf.
162
See Commission Opinion, supra note 161, at paras. 28–29, 5 n.1. (explaining that the
Civil Service Tribunal took two years to come into operation).
163
See id. at ¶ 32.
164
See id. at ¶¶ 16–18.
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They propose that more drastic changes are now

It is hardly surprising that the EU has so far shied away from a
radical overhaul of its trademark institutions. However worthy, the
EU trademark system is, for now at least, unlikely to attract as
much political attention as the other challenges facing Europe.
However, if the EU is to maintain confidence in its trademark
systems, it will need to keep a watchful eye on how OHIM, the
General Court and the CJEU interact. The key will be to maintain
and—to some extent—restore confidence in the consistency and
efficiency of these institutions. That will require investment: first
by OHIM (and therefore its fee-paying users), to ensure that speed
does not trump legal certainty; and secondly by EU taxpayers, to
ensure that the General Court and the CJEU bring in sufficient IP
talent to put trademark law in safe hands for the next twenty years.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: EU TRADEMARK LAW AND ITS
EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
As the overview above seeks to demonstrate, the EU has in
general made great strides in its harmonization and development of
trademark law over the past twenty years. There is every reason to
believe that this trend will continue for the next twenty years,
particularly if the necessary institutional and legislative reforms
take place. Having established its own strong foundations, there
may now be an opportunity for EU trademark law to play a more
global role. It also seems likely that it will itself become
increasingly subjected to external influence.

165

See HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, 14TH REPORT OF SESSION
2010–11, The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, H.L. 128 at ¶ 88
(Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/
ldselect/ldeucom/128/128.pdf.
166
See id.
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I. INSIDE-OUT
To influence trademark law elsewhere across the globe, the EU
must first seek to enter into multilateral treaties to encourage
foreign countries to adopt EU trademark norms. The AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) had been one such
attempt.167 Certain developed territories (including the EU, the
United States of America and Japan) sought to broker an
international trade agreement to export high standards of IP
protection worldwide, including in relation to anticounterfeiting.168 More than five years in the making, ACTA set
out the procedures and measures necessary to enforce intellectual
property rights and to counter large-scale infringements at
borders.169
But for all its grand designs, ACTA had two significant flaws.
First, it was not a truly international agreement. Key countries and
regions were missing from the treaty, including China (where a
significant proportion of the world’s counterfeits are
manufactured) and the Middle East (which is a major distribution
hub for Europe).170 Secondly, those responsible for ACTA failed
to convince their critics that ACTA fairly balanced IP rights with
fundamental freedoms.171
In this way, a seemingly wellintentioned treaty was hijacked by anti-establishment sentiment.
The European Parliament recently voted to reject ACTA, meaning
that it cannot now become law in the EU—”the first time that [the
European] Parliament [has] exercised its Lisbon Treaty power to

167
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf.
168
See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Partners Sign
Groundbreaking Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ACTA
Press
Release]
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2011/october/partners-sign-groundbreaking-anti-counterfeiting-t.
169
See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Press
Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties (Oct. 2011),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/jointpress-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag.
170
See ACTA Press Release, supra note 168 (showing that out of all ACTA negotiating
parties, no Middle Eastern country was present).
171
See David Jolly, A Question of Internet Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/technology/06iht-acta06.html?pagewanted=all#.
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reject an international trade agreement.”172 Controversially, this
vote took place before the CJEU had the chance to consider
ACTA’s compatibility with the EU treaties.173
Increased
protection for EU trademark owners against international
counterfeits is still some way off.
Secondly, the EU could leverage its relationship with the WTO
to develop a more detailed worldwide framework for trademark
protection. The EU, like the other 156 WTO members,174 is a
party to TRIPS, which also incorporates the relevant parts of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the
“Paris Convention”).175 The core rationale for TRIPS is similar to
that for EU trademark law: harmonising IP protection should
“reduce distortions and impediments to international trade” and
competition.176
Unsurprisingly, given the number of countries involved,
harmonization of trademark law under TRIPS and the Paris
Convention has been far more modest than within the EU. These
treaties, among other things, set out basic standards for trademark
registrability177 and infringement,178 and prohibit discrimination
against foreigners’ IP protection.179 However, many of the
relevant provisions remain optional or only set minimum
standards.180 Despite the wide reach of TRIPS and the Paris
Convention, there is still considerable scope for trademark
172

See Press Release, European Parliament, European Parliament Rejects ACTA (July
4, 2012), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/
20120703IPR48247/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA (“478 MEPs voted against
ACTA, 39 in favour, and 165 abstained.”).
173
See id.
174
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
175
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
176
TRIPS Preamble, supra note 175, TMD, supra note 1, recital 2.
177
See Paris Convention, supra note 175, art. 6quinquies(B); TRIPS, supra note 175, at
art. 15.
178
See TRIPS, supra note 175, at art. 16–17.
179
See id. at art. 4; Paris Convention, supra note 175, at art. 2(1).
180
See generally Paris Convention, supra note 175; TRIPS, supra note 175.
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protection to vary across the world. There is, in particular, sparse
harmonization of the standard of protection afforded to wellknown marks. Greater homogeneity would be most welcome.
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that there will be much political
appetite for broader global trademark reform, at least until the
ACTA dust has settled.
Thirdly, the EU could continue its educational approach to
promoting its trademark norms by offering to support trademark
law progress in developing countries. This may have benefits for
EU businesses that are looking to expand overseas and it could
help to strengthen the EU’s trade relationships in emerging
markets. The correct approach to providing this support will
depend on the country involved. As the EU already takes an active
role within WIPO, the best way to channel any such efforts may be
through the Regional Bureaus of the World Intellectual Property
Organization.
II. OUTSIDE-IN
While turning trademark law into the EU’s next global export
is perhaps rather ambitious, there is every chance that EU
trademark norms will find themselves increasingly influenced by
foreign pressures. For example, as a WTO member, the EU has
already accepted trademark-related obligations under TRIPS.
International law also has some indirect effect under EU law.
Although the CJEU has held that the validity of EU laws cannot
generally be assessed by reference to TRIPS,181 there are
circumstances in which the CJEU will, where possible, interpret
EU law in light of international treaty obligations.182 This rather
181
Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union, 1999 ECR
I-8395, ¶¶ 42–49; Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA and
Others, [2000] E.C.R. I-11307, ¶ 44; Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v.
Budĕjovický Budvar, národní podnik, [2004] E.C.R. I-10989, ¶ 54; Case C-491/01, The
Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd.,
2002 ECR I-11453, ¶¶ 154–56.
182
EU legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give
effect to an international agreement concluded by the EU. See, e.g., Case C-341/95,
Gianni Bettati v Safety Hi-Tech Srl., [1998] ECR I-4355, ¶ 20; Case C-306/05, Sociedad
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piecemeal approach to merging international and EU norms is
uncomfortable and has the potential to create significant legal
uncertainty. Far more satisfactory would be for the CJEU to
decide either that the EU’s international treaties have direct effect,
or that they have no effect unless expressly transposed. The
former has the advantage of putting the EU at the forefront of
compliance with international law, but will leave practitioners with
the heavy burden of juggling international, EU and national laws.
The latter would simplify the legal analysis but could expose the
EU to accusations that it has breached its international
commitments. This tension will have increasing relevance as the
EU continues its efforts to seek greater global trademark law
harmonization. Finding the right fit between international, EU and
national trademark law may be one of the biggest challenges facing
EU trademark jurists for the next twenty years.

General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA., [2006] ECR I11519, ¶ 35). In certain circumstances, the obligation may be limited to matters where
EU law is intended to implement the relevant treaty obligations. See Joined Cases 403 &
429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-___, at ¶ 186
(delivered on Oct. 4, 2011) (not yet reported).

